费尔南德·布罗代尔中心
纽约州宾汉顿大学，美国
http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm
伊曼纽尔·沃勒斯坦
（路爱国 译）
评论 第249号
自杀编年史预告：以色列
以色列国在
以色列国建立60年来，它的生存和扩张有赖于一个由三要素构成的总体战略：强硬军事主义、地缘政治联盟和公共关系。强硬军事主义（即现任总理埃胡德·奥尔默特[Ehud Olmert]所说的“铁腕”）来自于以色列犹太人的民族主义狂热，以及后来（尽管起初并非如此）世界各地犹太社区的强烈支持。
在地缘政治方面，以色列先是与苏联结盟（时间虽短但极其重要），随后与法国结盟（时间较长并使以色列成为核国家），最后（并且最重要地）与美国结盟。这些盟国兼后台通过供应武器给予了最重要的军事支持。但它们也给予了外交/政治支持，而美国还给予了可观的经济支持。
公共关系的目标在于获得世界舆论的广泛同情支持，早年间依靠把以色列描绘成血气方刚的大卫反抗老朽不堪的歌利亚，而后40年则依靠在二战期间纳粹大批清除欧洲犹太人问题上的罪行和怜悯。
以色列战略的所有这些要素在 1948年到1980年间都相当管用。事实上，它们变的越来越有效。但到1980年代某个时点，三个战术中每项战术的利用都开始产生反作用。以色列目前进 入了一个其战略加速衰败的阶段。以色列要推行任何其他战略可能已经太晚了，假如它这样做，它就会在地缘政治上自杀身亡。让我们回顾一下，在以色列力量成功 地上升以及在后来缓慢衰落的过程中，该战略的三个要素是如何互动的。
在以色列建立的头25年，它与阿拉 伯国家进行了4次战争。第一次是为建立犹太国而进行的1948-1949年战争。以色列宣布建立独立国家，巴勒斯坦却没有相应地也宣布建国。实际情况是， 许多阿拉伯国家对以色列宣了战。以色列最初在军事上困难重重。但是，以色列军队比外约旦以外其他阿拉伯国家的军队都更加训练有素。而且，更重要的是，他们 从代苏联行事的捷克斯洛伐克那里获得了武器。
到1949年停战时，以色列军队的 纪律性加上捷克的武器使以色列人赢得了联合国分割提议中没有包含的大片领土，包括西耶路撒冷。其他地区被周边阿拉伯国家并入。大批巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人离开或 被迫离开以色列控制的地区，变成了阿拉伯邻国里的难民，他们的后代今天仍大多生活在那里。他们曾经拥有的土地被以色列犹太人夺走了。
苏联不久就抛弃了以色列。这可能主 要是由于其领导人很快开始担心以色列建国对苏联犹太人态度的影响，从斯大林的观点看，苏联犹太人似乎过于热情，从而潜在地具有颠覆性。相应地，以色列也抛 弃了对冷战中社会主义阵营的所有同情，并清楚表明自己在政治和文化上要完全成为一个西方世界成员的热望。
法国此时正面临其三个北非殖民地的 民族解放运动，它认为以色列是一个有用的盟国。在阿尔及利亚人1954年发起自己的独立战争之后就更加如此。法国开始帮助以色列武装自己。特别是，正在 （不顾美国意愿而）发展本国核武器的法国帮助了以色列发展核武器。1956年，以色列加入法、英对埃及开战。对以色列而言，不幸的是这次战争是不顾美国反 对而发起的，美国迫使所有三个大国结束了战争。
在阿尔及利亚于1962年独立后， 法国失去了对以色列这个关系的兴趣，以色列当时干扰了法国与三个新独立的北非国家重建密切关系的努力。正是在这个时候，美国和以色列相互靠拢建立了密切关 系。1967年，埃及和以色列之间再次爆发战争，其他阿拉伯国家加入埃及一方。在这次所谓“六日战争”中，美国首次向以色列提供军用武器。
以色列1967年的胜利在很多方面 改变了基本局面。以色列轻易获胜，占领了英国托管的巴勒斯坦所有那些它已经占领的部分，再加上埃及的西奈半岛和叙利亚的戈兰高地。在司法上，此时存在着一 个以色列国，再加上以色列占领的领土。以色列开始推行在被占领土建立犹太人定居点的政策。
以色列的胜利改变了世界犹太人的态度，他们此时已经克服了对建立以色列国曾经持有的全部保留意见。他们对以色列的成就非常自豪，并开始在美国和西欧发起强大的政治运动为以色列争取政治支持。一个强调基布兹[以色列集体农场—译注]美德的血气方刚的以色列形象被放弃了，转而把强调大屠杀作为争取世界支持以色列的基本理由。
1973年，阿拉伯国家试图在所谓 赎罪日战争中扭转军事局势。这一次，在美国军事支持下，以色列又取得了战争胜利。1973年战争标志着阿拉伯国家核心作用的终结。以色列能够继续努力获得 阿拉伯国家的承认，它也确实最终得到了埃及和约旦两国的承认，但要让这一点成为保障以色列生存的方式此时已经太迟了。
正在这个时刻，一个真正的巴勒斯坦阿拉伯政治运动即巴勒斯坦解放组织(PLO)产生了，它现在是以色列的主要对手，是以色列需要与之妥协的对手。长期以来，以色列拒绝与巴解组织及其领导人亚西尔·阿拉法特打交道，而宁愿运用铁腕。起先，以色列在军事上是成功的。
铁腕政策的局限性在第一次起义[intifada]中暴露无疑，这是巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人在被占领土上的自发起义，始于1987年，持续了６年。起义的主要成果是双重的。它迫使以色列人和美国与巴解组织对话，这是一个长过程，它导致1993年达成了所谓奥斯陆协议，提出在部分被占领土上建立巴勒斯坦权力机构。
长远来看，奥斯陆协议在地缘政治上 对世界舆论的冲击不如起义重要。大卫-歌利亚形象第一次开始翻转过来。西方世界第一次开始出现对所谓两国方案的实际支持。第一次开始出现对以色列铁腕及其 对巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人所作所为的严肃批评。假如以色列原先严肃对待了以所谓“绿线”[Green Line]为基础的两国方案--即1948-1949年战争结束后的分界线，它或许已经取得了问题的解决。
但以色列总是慢一步。当它能与纳塞尔谈判的时候，它不肯谈。当它能与阿拉法特谈判的时候，它不肯谈。当阿拉法特去世而软弱无力的马哈茂德·阿巴斯继任的时候，更加好斗的哈马斯赢得了２００６年巴勒斯坦议会选举。以色列拒绝与哈马斯对话。
现在，以色列入侵了加沙，试图消灭哈马斯。假如它成功，下一个出现将是什么组织？假如—这种概率更高--它没能消灭哈马斯，一个两国方案现在还有可能实现吗？巴勒斯坦和世界舆论都在转向一国方案。而这当然是犹太复国主义计划的终结。
以色列的三要素战略正在解体。铁腕 不再奏效，正像它对乔治·布什而言在伊拉克没有奏效一样。与美国的关系是否将依然牢固？我怀疑这一点。世界舆论是否会继续同情地看待以色列？看来不会。以 色列现在能不能转向不同的战略，即作为中东有机组成部分而不是欧洲前哨与巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人的军事代表进行谈判的战略？对此而言似乎为时已晚，很可能太晚 了。从而，预告了一个自杀编年史。
[伊曼纽尔·沃勒斯坦（Immanuel Wallerstein）版权所有，Agence Global负责发行。有关版权和授权，包括翻译和张贴到非商业网站事宜，请与rights@agenceglobal.com、1.336.686.9002或1.336.286.6606联系。在不改动本评论和展示版权所有条件下，允许下载、电子转发或通过电子邮件发送他人。如欲与作者联系，可发邮件给immanuel.wallerstein@yale.edu。
Commentary No. 249, Jan. 15, 2009
"Chronicle of a Suicide Foretold: The Case of Israel"
The state of Israel proclaimed its independence at midnight on May 15, 1948. The United Nations had voted to establish two states in what had been Palestine under British rule. The city of Jerusalem was supposed to be an international zone under U.N. jurisdiction. The U.N. resolution had wide support, and specifically that of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Arab states all voted against it.
In the sixty years of its existence, the state of Israel has depended for its survival and expansion on an overall strategy that combined three elements: macho militarism, geopolitical alliances, and public relations. The macho militarism (what current Prime Minister Ehud Olmert calls the "iron fist") was made possible by the nationalist fervor of Jewish Israelis, and eventually (although not initially) by the very strong support of Jewish communities elsewhere in the world.
Geopolitically, Israel first forged an alliance with the Soviet Union (which was brief but crucial), then with France (which lasted a longer time and allowed Israel to become a nuclear power), and finally (and most importantly) with the United States. These allies, who were also patrons, offered most importantly military support through the provision of weapons. But they also offered diplomatic/political support, and in the case of the United States considerable economic support.
The public relations was aimed at obtaining sympathetic support from a wide swath of world public opinion, based in the early years on a portrait of Israel as a pioneering David against a retrograde Goliath, and in the last forty years on guilt and compassion over the massive Nazi extermination of European Jewry during the Second World War.
All these elements of Israeli strategy worked well from 1948 to the 1980s. Indeed, they were increasingly more effective. But somewhere in the 1980s, the use of each of the three tactics began to be counterproductive. Israel has now entered into a phase of the precipitate decline of its strategy. It may be too late for Israel to pursue any alternative strategy, in which case it will have committed geopolitical suicide. Let us trace how the three elements in the strategy interacted, first during the successful upward swing, then during the slow decline of Israel's power.
For the first twenty-five years of its existence, Israel engaged in four wars with Arab states. The first was the 1948-1949 war to establish the Jewish state. The Israeli declaration of an independent state was not matched by a Palestinian declaration to establish a state. Rather, a number of Arab governments declared war on Israel. Israel was initially in military difficulty. However, the Israeli military were far better trained than those of the Arab countries, with the exception of Transjordan. And, crucially, they obtained arms from Czechoslovakia, acting as the agent of the Soviet Union.
By the time of the truce in 1949, the discipline of the Israeli forces combined with the Czech arms enabled the Israelis to win considerable territory not included in the partition proposals of the United Nations, including west Jerusalem. The other areas were incorporated by the surrounding Arab states. A large number of Palestinian Arabs left or were forced to leave areas under the control of the Israelis and became refugees in neighboring Arab countries, where their descendants still largely live today. The land they had owned was taken by Jewish Israelis.
The Soviet Union soon dropped Israel. This was probably primarily because its leaders quickly became afraid of the impact of the creation of the state on the attitudes of Soviet Jewry, who seemed overly enthusiastic and hence potentially subversive from Stalin's point of view. Israel in turn dropped any sympathy for the socialist camp in the Cold War, and made clear its fervent desire to be considered a full-fledged member of the Western world, politically and culturally.
France at this time was faced with national liberation movements in its three North African colonies, and saw in Israel a useful ally. This was especially true after the Algerians launched their war of independence in 1954. France began to help Israel arm itself. In particular, France, which was developing its own nuclear weapons (against U.S. wishes), helped Israel do the same. In 1956, Israel joined France and Great Britain in a war against Egypt. Unfortunately for Israel, this war was launched against U.S. opposition, and the United States forced all three powers to end it.
After Algeria became independent in 1962, France lost interest in the Israeli connection, which now interfered with its attempts to renew closer relations with the three now independent North African states. It was at this point that the United States and Israel turned to each other to forge close links. In 1967, war broke out again between Egypt and Israel, and other Arab states joined Egypt. In this so-called Six Day War, the United States for the first time gave military weapons to Israel.
The 1967 Israeli victory changed the basic situation in many respects. Israel had won the war handily, occupying all those parts of the British mandate of Palestine that it had occupied before, plus Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Syria's Golan Heights. Juridically, there was now a state of Israel plus Israel's occupied territories. Israel began a policy of establishing
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.
The Israeli victory transformed the attitude of world Jewry, which now overcame whatever reservations it had had about the creation of the state of Israel. They took great pride in its accomplishments and began to undertake major political campaigns in the United States and western Europe to secure political support for Israel. The image of a pioneering Israel with emphasis on the virtues of the kibbutz was abandoned in favor of an emphasis on the Holocaust as the basic justification for world support of Israel.
In 1973, the Arab states sought to redress the military situation in the so-called Yom Kippur war. This time again, Israel won the war, with U.S. arms support. The 1973 war marked the end of the central role of the Arab states. Israel could continue to try to get recognition from Arab states, and it did succeed eventually with both Egypt and Jordan, but it was now too late for this to be a way to secure Israel's existence.
As of this point, there emerged a serious Palestinian Arab political movement, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was now the key opponent of Israel, the one with whom Israel needed to come to terms. For a long time, Israel refused to deal with the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat, preferring the iron fist. And at first, it was militarily successful.
The limits of the iron fist policy were made evident by the first intifada, a spontaneous uprising of Palestinian Arabs inside the occupied territories, which began in 1987 and lasted six years. The basic achievement of the intifada was twofold. It forced the Israelis and the United States to talk to the PLO, a long process that led to the so-called Oslo Accords of 1993, which provided for the creation of the Palestinian Authority in part of the occupied territories.
The Oslo Accords in the long run were geopolitically less important than the impact of the intifada on world public opinion. For the first time, the David-Goliath image began to be inverted. For the first time, there began to be serious support in the Western world for the so-called two-state solution. For the first time, there began to be serious criticism of Israel's iron fist and its practices vis-à-vis the Arab Palestinians. Had Israel been serious about a two-state solution based on the so-called Green Line - the line of division at the end of the 1948-1949 war - it probably would have achieved a settlement.
Israel however was always one step behind. When it could have negotiated with Nasser, it wouldn't. When it could have negotiated with Arafat, it wouldn't. When Arafat died and was succeeded by the ineffectual Mahmoud Abbas, the more militant Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006. Israel refused to talk to Hamas.
Now, Israel has invaded Gaza, seeking to destroy Hamas. If it succeeds, what organization will come next? If, as is more probable, it fails to destroy Hamas, is a two-state solution now possible? Both Palestinian and world public opinion is moving towards the one-state solution. And this is of course the end of the Zionist project.
The three-element strategy of Israel is decomposing. The iron fist no longer succeeds, much as it didn't for George Bush in Iraq. Will the United States link remain firm? I doubt it. And will world public opinion continue to look sympathetically on Israel? It seems not. Can Israel now switch to an alternative strategy, of negotiating with the militant representatives of the Arab Palestinians, as an integral constituent of the Middle East, and not as an outpost of Europe? It seems quite late for that, quite possibly too late. Hence, the chronicle of a suicide foretold.
by Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence Global. For rights and permissions, including translations and posting to non-commercial sites, and contact: rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.336.286.6606. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically, or e-mail to others, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To contact author, write: immanuel.wallerstein@yale.edu.These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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