费尔南德·布罗代尔中心
纽约州宾汉顿大学，美国
http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm
伊曼纽尔·沃勒斯坦
（路爱国 译）
评论 第248号
2009年1月1日
古巴重返舞台！
世界经济/金融危机似乎日甚一日，整个中东地区的政治和军事继续分崩离析，全球都在期待着奥巴马就任总统，在这一切之中，世界很少注意到2008年12月中旬的一个重大地缘政治事件。古巴重返舞台！有4次拉美国家会议在巴西巴伊亚州萨尔瓦多 [Salvador de Bahía]先后举行。按出席国家的数量排序，这些会议是南美共同市场[Mercosur]会议，南美国家组织[Unasur]会议，里约集团[the Grupo de Río]会议，以及拉丁美洲和加勒比海地区第一届高峰会议(西班牙语缩写为CALC)。这些会议的主持人是巴西总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦[Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva]，而“主角”则是古巴。卢拉称之为一场“意识形态飓风”。
让我们看看发生了什么。南美共同市场是巴西、阿根廷、乌拉圭和巴拉圭的共同市场协议，委内瑞拉正在加入进来。五国总统已经宣布，他们将吸收玻利维亚的全部出口产品，因为美国在9月份撤消了该国的优惠关税，表面的理由是玻利维亚没有尽力打击毒品买卖。
这一行动得到了 南美国家组织的支持，这个组织是南美全部12个国家（加上作为观察员的墨西哥和巴拿马）的联盟。更重要的是，南美国家组织同意了巴西的提议，即成立“南美 防御委员会”。仅在去年5月份南美国家组织还曾搁置了这个提议（美国对该提议表示不悦），为此，巴西外交部长塞尔索 阿莫林[Celso Amorim]认为这个决定是“意外惊喜”。他说，这体现了拉丁美洲是拉丁美洲人的拉丁美洲的思想，这与“美洲是美洲人的美洲”的门罗主义口号针锋相对。
然而，真正重要的事件出现在12月16日里约集团会议上。里约集团是1986年建立的拉美政治论坛，到2008年已拥有22个国家，在这次会议上，该集团“一致同意”接受古巴为成员国。作为本届会议主席的墨西哥总统费利佩·卡尔德龙[Felipe Calderón]在全场起立欢呼声中欢迎劳尔·卡斯特罗为代表的古巴“兄弟人民”。论坛随即谴责美国对古巴的禁运，并要求美国必须结束禁运。
卡尔德龙和卡斯特罗举行了私下会见，以便解决卡尔德龙的前任文森特·福克斯[Vicente Fox]所造成的两国关系中的“棘手问题”。会后，卡斯特罗说，现在的关系“非常之好”。两人宣布，他们在2009年将正式进行互访。
达到高潮的会议是拉丁美洲和加勒比海地区所有33国总统的高峰会议，这在历史上是首次。只有三位总统本人没有与会，但借故另外派了人来，他们是哥伦比亚的阿尔瓦罗·乌里韦[Alvaro Uribe]、秘鲁的阿兰·加西亚[Alan García]和萨尔瓦多的埃利亚斯·安东尼奥·萨卡[Elias Antonio Saca]，他们是美国在拉丁美洲最后的坚定朋友。巴西非常希望尽可能多的人与会，以至派出了军用飞机把较穷的中美洲和加勒比海国家的总统空运到会场。
这次会议的意义要看被排除在外的国家。无论美国还是以前的殖民大国西班牙和葡萄牙都没有受到邀请。厄瓜多尔总统拉斐尔·科雷亚[Rafael Correa]说，会议标志着 “傀儡政府” 在拉丁美洲结束了。巴西记者佩佩·埃斯科巴[Pepe Escobar]把它叫做“向奥巴马潜艇发射的一枚水雷”。
这次会议的开会时间并不是偶然的。美洲第五次高峰会议计划于4月份在特立尼达召开。这是克林顿总统1994年发起成立的一个组织。同一批国家和政府的首脑将受到邀请，只不过多了两个国家即美国和加拿大，少了一个国家即古巴。
据说，奥巴马将 在那里面对巴西会议上提出的问题和提议。第一要撤消暂停古巴在美洲国家组织中成员资格的决定，从而把古巴包括进来。卢拉表示，为了改善古巴和美国的关系， 恰恰是美国必须解除禁运从而迈出第一步。第二是重审尚未清偿的国家债务。厄瓜多尔已经宣布延缓进一步偿付债务，说是在偿还了28年债务之后，它仍然欠着同 样数量的债务—这是一个“悲惨的故事”，如科雷亚总统所说。
卡斯特罗说，他 准备与奥巴马直接会谈。“如果他想讨论，我们愿意讨论。要孤立古巴越来越难了。”卢拉挑战奥巴马事实上走得更远。他说，只有在他撤销对古巴封锁的时候，其 总统任期才能真正具有历史意义。与此同时，曾经作为美国后院的拉丁美洲越来越对其他世界大国开放。俄国、中国和伊朗都显著扩大了它们在拉丁美洲的作用。
最近加入进来的是法国。尼古拉·萨科齐总 统于12月22-23日对巴西进行了正式访问。两国不但同意扩大商业往来，而且同意扩大非常重要的军事往来。法国今后将帮助巴西海军建造5艘“新一代”潜 艇，其中包括一艘核动力潜艇，这是拉丁美洲第一艘这样的潜艇。此外，法国同意向巴西转让必要技术，从而，未来巴西能够依靠自身力量建造更多潜艇。法国还将 帮助巴西建造所谓重型直升机，巴西打算成为这类飞机的出口国。
古巴的球、厄瓜多尔的球以及巴西的球现在都到了奥巴马场内。到4月份他必须让我们知道他将如何回应。
[伊曼纽尔·沃勒斯坦（Immanuel Wallerstein）版权所有，Agence Global负责发行。有关版权和授权，包括翻译和张贴到非商业网站事宜，请与rights@agenceglobal.com、1.336.686.9002或1.336.286.6606联系。在不改动本评论和展示版权所有条件下，允许下载、电子转发或通过电子邮件发送他人。如欲与作者联系，可发邮件给immanuel.wallerstein@yale.edu。
Commentary No. 249, Jan. 15, 2009
"Chronicle of a Suicide Foretold: The Case of Israel"
The state of Israel proclaimed its independence at midnight on May 15, 1948. The United Nations had voted to establish two states in what had been Palestine under British rule. The city of Jerusalem was supposed to be an international zone under U.N. jurisdiction. The U.N. resolution had wide support, and specifically that of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Arab states all voted against it.
In the sixty years of its existence, the state of Israel has depended for its survival and expansion on an overall strategy that combined three elements: macho militarism, geopolitical alliances, and public relations. The macho militarism (what current Prime Minister Ehud Olmert calls the "iron fist") was made possible by the nationalist fervor of Jewish Israelis, and eventually (although not initially) by the very strong support of Jewish communities elsewhere in the world.
Geopolitically, Israel first forged an alliance with the Soviet Union (which was brief but crucial), then with France (which lasted a longer time and allowed Israel to become a nuclear power), and finally (and most importantly) with the United States. These allies, who were also patrons, offered most importantly military support through the provision of weapons. But they also offered diplomatic/political support, and in the case of the United States considerable economic support.
The public relations was aimed at obtaining sympathetic support from a wide swath of world public opinion, based in the early years on a portrait of Israel as a pioneering David against a retrograde Goliath, and in the last forty years on guilt and compassion over the massive Nazi extermination of European Jewry during the Second World War.
All these elements of Israeli strategy worked well from 1948 to the 1980s. Indeed, they were increasingly more effective. But somewhere in the 1980s, the use of each of the three tactics began to be counterproductive. Israel has now entered into a phase of the precipitate decline of its strategy. It may be too late for Israel to pursue any alternative strategy, in which case it will have committed geopolitical suicide. Let us trace how the three elements in the strategy interacted, first during the successful upward swing, then during the slow decline of Israel's power.
For the first twenty-five years of its existence, Israel engaged in four wars with Arab states. The first was the 1948-1949 war to establish the Jewish state. The Israeli declaration of an independent state was not matched by a Palestinian declaration to establish a state. Rather, a number of Arab governments declared war on Israel. Israel was initially in military difficulty. However, the Israeli military were far better trained than those of the Arab countries, with the exception of Transjordan. And, crucially, they obtained arms from Czechoslovakia, acting as the agent of the Soviet Union.
By the time of the truce in 1949, the discipline of the Israeli forces combined with the Czech arms enabled the Israelis to win considerable territory not included in the partition proposals of the United Nations, including west Jerusalem. The other areas were incorporated by the surrounding Arab states. A large number of Palestinian Arabs left or were forced to leave areas under the control of the Israelis and became refugees in neighboring Arab countries, where their descendants still largely live today. The land they had owned was taken by Jewish Israelis.
The Soviet Union soon dropped Israel. This was probably primarily because its leaders quickly became afraid of the impact of the creation of the state on the attitudes of Soviet Jewry, who seemed overly enthusiastic and hence potentially subversive from Stalin's point of view. Israel in turn dropped any sympathy for the socialist camp in the Cold War, and made clear its fervent desire to be considered a full-fledged member of the Western world, politically and culturally.
France at this time was faced with national liberation movements in its three North African colonies, and saw in Israel a useful ally. This was especially true after the Algerians launched their war of independence in 1954. France began to help Israel arm itself. In particular, France, which was developing its own nuclear weapons (against U.S. wishes), helped Israel do the same. In 1956, Israel joined France and Great Britain in a war against Egypt. Unfortunately for Israel, this war was launched against U.S. opposition, and the United States forced all three powers to end it.
After Algeria became independent in 1962, France lost interest in the Israeli connection, which now interfered with its attempts to renew closer relations with the three now independent North African states. It was at this point that the United States and Israel turned to each other to forge close links. In 1967, war broke out again between Egypt and Israel, and other Arab states joined Egypt. In this so-called Six Day War, the United States for the first time gave military weapons to Israel.
The 1967 Israeli victory changed the basic situation in many respects. Israel had won the war handily, occupying all those parts of the British mandate of Palestine that it had occupied before, plus Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Syria's Golan Heights. Juridically, there was now a state of Israel plus Israel's occupied territories. Israel began a policy of establishing
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.
The Israeli victory transformed the attitude of world Jewry, which now overcame whatever reservations it had had about the creation of the state of Israel. They took great pride in its accomplishments and began to undertake major political campaigns in the United States and western Europe to secure political support for Israel. The image of a pioneering Israel with emphasis on the virtues of the kibbutz was abandoned in favor of an emphasis on the Holocaust as the basic justification for world support of Israel.
In 1973, the Arab states sought to redress the military situation in the so-called Yom Kippur war. This time again, Israel won the war, with U.S. arms support. The 1973 war marked the end of the central role of the Arab states. Israel could continue to try to get recognition from Arab states, and it did succeed eventually with both Egypt and Jordan, but it was now too late for this to be a way to secure Israel's existence.
As of this point, there emerged a serious Palestinian Arab political movement, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was now the key opponent of Israel, the one with whom Israel needed to come to terms. For a long time, Israel refused to deal with the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat, preferring the iron fist. And at first, it was militarily successful.
The limits of the iron fist policy were made evident by the first intifada, a spontaneous uprising of Palestinian Arabs inside the occupied territories, which began in 1987 and lasted six years. The basic achievement of the intifada was twofold. It forced the Israelis and the United States to talk to the PLO, a long process that led to the so-called Oslo Accords of 1993, which provided for the creation of the Palestinian Authority in part of the occupied territories.
The Oslo Accords in the long run were geopolitically less important than the impact of the intifada on world public opinion. For the first time, the David-Goliath image began to be inverted. For the first time, there began to be serious support in the Western world for the so-called two-state solution. For the first time, there began to be serious criticism of Israel's iron fist and its practices vis-à-vis the Arab Palestinians. Had Israel been serious about a two-state solution based on the so-called Green Line - the line of division at the end of the 1948-1949 war - it probably would have achieved a settlement.
Israel however was always one step behind. When it could have negotiated with Nasser, it wouldn't. When it could have negotiated with Arafat, it wouldn't. When Arafat died and was succeeded by the ineffectual Mahmoud Abbas, the more militant Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006. Israel refused to talk to Hamas.
Now, Israel has invaded Gaza, seeking to destroy Hamas. If it succeeds, what organization will come next? If, as is more probable, it fails to destroy Hamas, is a two-state solution now possible? Both Palestinian and world public opinion is moving towards the one-state solution. And this is of course the end of the Zionist project.
The three-element strategy of Israel is decomposing. The iron fist no longer succeeds, much as it didn't for George Bush in Iraq. Will the United States link remain firm? I doubt it. And will world public opinion continue to look sympathetically on Israel? It seems not. Can Israel now switch to an alternative strategy, of negotiating with the militant representatives of the Arab Palestinians, as an integral constituent of the Middle East, and not as an outpost of Europe? It seems quite late for that, quite possibly too late. Hence, the chronicle of a suicide foretold.
by Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence Global. For rights and permissions, including translations and posting to non-commercial sites, and contact: rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.336.286.6606. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically, or e-mail to others, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To contact author, write: immanuel.wallerstein@yale.edu.These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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