费尔南德·布罗代尔中心
纽约州宾汉顿大学，美国
http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm
伊曼纽尔·沃勒斯坦
（路爱国 译）
评论 第247号
2008年12月15日
巴基斯坦：奥巴马的噩梦
2008年11月26日，一个10人小团体袭击了（印度）孟买市中心的两个豪华酒店和其他地点，在几天之内打死打伤众多人员，并给该市造成了巨大的物质破坏。花了几天时间才终结了这场屠杀。人们广泛相信，袭击是一个叫做“虔诚军”[Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET)]的巴基斯坦组织所为，这个组织的动机据说与基地组织类似，也许与之直接有关。世界媒体立即把孟买的杀戮称为印度的9/11，是基地组织2001年对美国袭击的翻版。
2001年，无论美国政府还是分析 人士都从根本上误解了基地组织在2001年的动机和战略。同样的事情目前有再次发生的危险。基地组织在2001年当然试图羞辱美国。但从战略观点上看，这 不过是个次要动机。基地组织一向明确表示，其首要目标是重新建立伊斯兰哈里发帝国。而且，作为一项政治战略，它认为沙特阿拉伯和巴基斯坦政府的垮台是必要 的第一步。基地组织认为，这两个政府是西方（主要是美国）在大中东地区实行政治支配的主要政治支持者，从而是重建哈里发帝国的最大的障碍，该帝国最初的地 理位置当然会在这个地区。
9/11袭击可以看作是试图让美国政府采取某些政治行动，这些行动能对沙特和巴基斯坦政府形成压力，从而破坏它们的政治稳定。美国政府2001年之后在该地区采取的主要行动—先是入侵阿富汗后又入侵伊拉克—肯定符合了基地组织的预期。结果如何呢？
沙特政府以高度的政治技巧做出了反 应，它抵挡着从内部削弱自己的美国压力，到目前为止把基地组织在沙特阿拉伯的政治成功降到了最低限度。巴基斯坦政府远没有那么成功。伊斯兰堡的政权在 2008年比其前任在2001年时要虚弱得多，而基地组织一类团体的政治力量却在不断上升。孟买袭击似是进一步削弱巴基斯坦国家的一种努力。当然，“虔诚军”希望伤害印度及其所谓盟国，即美国、英国和以色列，但这是一个次要的目标。主要目标是把巴基斯坦政府赶下台。
就像世上任何国家一样，巴基斯坦的 政治精英也是民族主义的，他们追求扩大本国的地缘政治利益。这个目标与基地组织一类团体的目标是根本不同的，对后者来说，一个国家唯一合法的职能就是推动 重建哈里发帝国。西方世界坚持拒绝理解这一区别是基地组织依然有力的一个主要来源。这正是会把巴基斯坦变成奥巴马噩梦的问题所在。
巴基斯坦的地缘政治利益何在？首 先，它对自己的主要邻国即印度和阿富汗忧心忡忡。这种担忧造就了其最近60年的地缘政治战略。巴基斯坦寻找强大的盟友以对付印度。在历史上它找到了两个， 即美国和中国。美中支持巴基斯坦出于一个简单的原因，即遏制印度。在这两国看来，印度在地缘政治上与苏联的关系过于亲密，而美中都与苏联处于冲突之中。
在1990年代，随着冷战结束和俄 国地缘政治地位暂时削弱，美国和中国都试探与印度建立更密切的关系。从地缘政治上说，印度比巴基斯坦的地位更显赫，巴基斯坦也明白这一点。巴基斯坦回应的 方式之一是，通过支持塔利班最终成功地接管阿富汗，扩大自己在该国（以及在控制该国中）的作用。
2001年后发生了什么？美国入侵 了阿富汗，推翻了塔利班，扶持了一个政府上台，该政府中有亲美、亲俄、甚至亲伊朗的成员，但完全没有亲巴基斯坦的成员。与此同时，随着核能新协议的签署， 美国和印度的关系变得更加密切。所以，巴基斯坦政府对在阿富汗接壤的西北部落地区的塔利班力量复兴视而不见。那里的塔利班团体在基地组织团体的支持下，重 新开展了在阿富汗的军事行动，需要指出的是，还获得了相当的成功。
美国对此非常不满，它逼迫巴基斯坦 军队从军事上打击这些塔利班/基地组织团体，它自己也在这个地区进行了直接（但秘而不宣）的军事行动。巴基斯坦政府发现自己陷入了进退维谷的境地。它从来 没有多大能力去控制部落地区的事务。在美国政府压力下所做的努力又进一步削弱了它自己。但它的效率低下使美国军队的行动甚至更加直接，这导致甚至在历史上 最亲美的精英中间也出现了严重的反美情绪。
奥巴马能做什么？派兵进去？反对谁呢？巴基斯坦政府本身？据说，美国政府特别关注巴基斯坦拥有的核武库。美国政府要夺取这个武库？在这方面采取任何行动—竞选期间奥巴马曾卤莽地暗示采取这类行动—将让伊拉克大败局变成小事一桩。它将导致奥巴马的国内目标必败无疑。
无所作为是不可接受的软弱—对他提 出这样建议的人肯定不少。这是奥巴马唯一的选择吗？清楚的是，正如他自己所说的那样，要实现其议程，就要摆脱美国在中东没有尽头而地缘政治上又毫无所获的 行动。伊拉克容易对付，因为伊拉克人会坚持让美国撤军。阿富汗更困难一些，但达成一项政治交易并非没有可能。伊朗可以进行谈判。以色列/巴勒斯坦冲突目前 无法解决，奥巴马所能做的或许无非是让局势继续恶化。
但是，巴基斯坦需要一项决策。巴基斯坦政府要存在下去，它就必须是一个能显示自己维护本国地缘政治利益的政府。考虑到国内局势以及愤怒的印度舆论，这将非常不易。这也正是奥巴马能够明智地采取行动的地方。
[伊曼纽尔·沃勒斯坦（Immanuel Wallerstein）版权所有，Agence Global负责发行。有关版权和授权，包括翻译和张贴到非商业网站事宜，请与rights@agenceglobal.com、1.336.686.9002或1.336.286.6606联系。在不改动本评论和展示版权所有条件下，允许下载、电子转发或通过电子邮件发送他人。如欲与作者联系，可发邮件给immanuel.wallerstein@yale.edu。
Commentary No. 249, Jan. 15, 2009
"Chronicle of a Suicide Foretold: The Case of Israel"
The state of Israel proclaimed its independence at midnight on May 15, 1948. The United Nations had voted to establish two states in what had been Palestine under British rule. The city of Jerusalem was supposed to be an international zone under U.N. jurisdiction. The U.N. resolution had wide support, and specifically that of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Arab states all voted against it.
In the sixty years of its existence, the state of Israel has depended for its survival and expansion on an overall strategy that combined three elements: macho militarism, geopolitical alliances, and public relations. The macho militarism (what current Prime Minister Ehud Olmert calls the "iron fist") was made possible by the nationalist fervor of Jewish Israelis, and eventually (although not initially) by the very strong support of Jewish communities elsewhere in the world.
Geopolitically, Israel first forged an alliance with the Soviet Union (which was brief but crucial), then with France (which lasted a longer time and allowed Israel to become a nuclear power), and finally (and most importantly) with the United States. These allies, who were also patrons, offered most importantly military support through the provision of weapons. But they also offered diplomatic/political support, and in the case of the United States considerable economic support.
The public relations was aimed at obtaining sympathetic support from a wide swath of world public opinion, based in the early years on a portrait of Israel as a pioneering David against a retrograde Goliath, and in the last forty years on guilt and compassion over the massive Nazi extermination of European Jewry during the Second World War.
All these elements of Israeli strategy worked well from 1948 to the 1980s. Indeed, they were increasingly more effective. But somewhere in the 1980s, the use of each of the three tactics began to be counterproductive. Israel has now entered into a phase of the precipitate decline of its strategy. It may be too late for Israel to pursue any alternative strategy, in which case it will have committed geopolitical suicide. Let us trace how the three elements in the strategy interacted, first during the successful upward swing, then during the slow decline of Israel's power.
For the first twenty-five years of its existence, Israel engaged in four wars with Arab states. The first was the 1948-1949 war to establish the Jewish state. The Israeli declaration of an independent state was not matched by a Palestinian declaration to establish a state. Rather, a number of Arab governments declared war on Israel. Israel was initially in military difficulty. However, the Israeli military were far better trained than those of the Arab countries, with the exception of Transjordan. And, crucially, they obtained arms from Czechoslovakia, acting as the agent of the Soviet Union.
By the time of the truce in 1949, the discipline of the Israeli forces combined with the Czech arms enabled the Israelis to win considerable territory not included in the partition proposals of the United Nations, including west Jerusalem. The other areas were incorporated by the surrounding Arab states. A large number of Palestinian Arabs left or were forced to leave areas under the control of the Israelis and became refugees in neighboring Arab countries, where their descendants still largely live today. The land they had owned was taken by Jewish Israelis.
The Soviet Union soon dropped Israel. This was probably primarily because its leaders quickly became afraid of the impact of the creation of the state on the attitudes of Soviet Jewry, who seemed overly enthusiastic and hence potentially subversive from Stalin's point of view. Israel in turn dropped any sympathy for the socialist camp in the Cold War, and made clear its fervent desire to be considered a full-fledged member of the Western world, politically and culturally.
France at this time was faced with national liberation movements in its three North African colonies, and saw in Israel a useful ally. This was especially true after the Algerians launched their war of independence in 1954. France began to help Israel arm itself. In particular, France, which was developing its own nuclear weapons (against U.S. wishes), helped Israel do the same. In 1956, Israel joined France and Great Britain in a war against Egypt. Unfortunately for Israel, this war was launched against U.S. opposition, and the United States forced all three powers to end it.
After Algeria became independent in 1962, France lost interest in the Israeli connection, which now interfered with its attempts to renew closer relations with the three now independent North African states. It was at this point that the United States and Israel turned to each other to forge close links. In 1967, war broke out again between Egypt and Israel, and other Arab states joined Egypt. In this so-called Six Day War, the United States for the first time gave military weapons to Israel.
The 1967 Israeli victory changed the basic situation in many respects. Israel had won the war handily, occupying all those parts of the British mandate of Palestine that it had occupied before, plus Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Syria's Golan Heights. Juridically, there was now a state of Israel plus Israel's occupied territories. Israel began a policy of establishing
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.
The Israeli victory transformed the attitude of world Jewry, which now overcame whatever reservations it had had about the creation of the state of Israel. They took great pride in its accomplishments and began to undertake major political campaigns in the United States and western Europe to secure political support for Israel. The image of a pioneering Israel with emphasis on the virtues of the kibbutz was abandoned in favor of an emphasis on the Holocaust as the basic justification for world support of Israel.
In 1973, the Arab states sought to redress the military situation in the so-called Yom Kippur war. This time again, Israel won the war, with U.S. arms support. The 1973 war marked the end of the central role of the Arab states. Israel could continue to try to get recognition from Arab states, and it did succeed eventually with both Egypt and Jordan, but it was now too late for this to be a way to secure Israel's existence.
As of this point, there emerged a serious Palestinian Arab political movement, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was now the key opponent of Israel, the one with whom Israel needed to come to terms. For a long time, Israel refused to deal with the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat, preferring the iron fist. And at first, it was militarily successful.
The limits of the iron fist policy were made evident by the first intifada, a spontaneous uprising of Palestinian Arabs inside the occupied territories, which began in 1987 and lasted six years. The basic achievement of the intifada was twofold. It forced the Israelis and the United States to talk to the PLO, a long process that led to the so-called Oslo Accords of 1993, which provided for the creation of the Palestinian Authority in part of the occupied territories.
The Oslo Accords in the long run were geopolitically less important than the impact of the intifada on world public opinion. For the first time, the David-Goliath image began to be inverted. For the first time, there began to be serious support in the Western world for the so-called two-state solution. For the first time, there began to be serious criticism of Israel's iron fist and its practices vis-à-vis the Arab Palestinians. Had Israel been serious about a two-state solution based on the so-called Green Line - the line of division at the end of the 1948-1949 war - it probably would have achieved a settlement.
Israel however was always one step behind. When it could have negotiated with Nasser, it wouldn't. When it could have negotiated with Arafat, it wouldn't. When Arafat died and was succeeded by the ineffectual Mahmoud Abbas, the more militant Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006. Israel refused to talk to Hamas.
Now, Israel has invaded Gaza, seeking to destroy Hamas. If it succeeds, what organization will come next? If, as is more probable, it fails to destroy Hamas, is a two-state solution now possible? Both Palestinian and world public opinion is moving towards the one-state solution. And this is of course the end of the Zionist project.
The three-element strategy of Israel is decomposing. The iron fist no longer succeeds, much as it didn't for George Bush in Iraq. Will the United States link remain firm? I doubt it. And will world public opinion continue to look sympathetically on Israel? It seems not. Can Israel now switch to an alternative strategy, of negotiating with the militant representatives of the Arab Palestinians, as an integral constituent of the Middle East, and not as an outpost of Europe? It seems quite late for that, quite possibly too late. Hence, the chronicle of a suicide foretold.
by Immanuel Wallerstein
[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence Global. For rights and permissions, including translations and posting to non-commercial sites, and contact: rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.336.286.6606. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically, or e-mail to others, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To contact author, write: immanuel.wallerstein@yale.edu.These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]
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