Showing posts with label Soros. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Soros. Show all posts

Thursday, March 26, 2009

"Peripheral care should be the central concern"

FINANCIAL TIMES
"Peripheral care should be the central concern"
By George Soros
Monday, March 23, 2009

The forthcoming Group of 20 meeting is a make-or-break event. Unless it comes up with practical measures to support the less developed countries, which are even more vulnerable than the developed ones, markets are going to suffer another sinking spell just as they did last month when Tim Geithner, Treasury secretary, failed to produce practical measures to recapitalise the US banking system.

This crisis is different from all the others since the end of the second world war. Previously, the authorities got their act together and prevented the financial system from collapsing. This time, after the failure of Lehman Brothers last September, the system broke down and was put on artificial life support. Among other measures, both Europe and the US in effect guaranteed that no other important financial institution would be allowed to fail.

This necessary step had unintended adverse consequences: many other countries, from eastern Europe to Latin America, Africa and south-east Asia, could not offer similar guarantees. As a result, capital fled from the periphery to the centre. The flight was abetted by national financial authorities at the centre who encouraged banks to repatriate their capital. In the periphery countries, currencies fell, interest rates rose and credit default swap rates soared. When history is written, it will be recorded that - in contrast to the Great Depression - protectionism first prevailed in finance rather than trade.

Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund face a novel task: to protect the periphery countries from a storm created in the developed world. Global institutions are used to dealing with governments; now they must deal with the collapse of the private sector. If they fail to do so, the periphery economies will suffer even more than those at the centre, because they are poorer and more dependent on commodities than the developed world. They also face $1,440bn (€1,060bn, £994bn) of bank loans coming due in 2009. These loans cannot be rolled over without international aid.

Gordon Brown, the UK prime minister, recognised the problem and designated the G20 meeting to address it. Yet profound attitudinal differences have surfaced, particularly between the US and Germany. The US has recognised that the collapse of credit in the private sector can be reversed only by using the credit of the state to the full. Germany, traumatised by the memory of hyperinflation in the 1920s, is reluctant to sow the seeds of future inflation by incurring too much debt. Both positions are firmly held. The controversy threatens to disrupt the meeting.

Yet it should be possible to find common ground. Instead of setting a universal target of 2 per cent of gross domestic product for stimulus packages, it is enough to agree that the periphery countries need aid to protect their financial systems. This is in the common interest. If the periphery economies are allowed to collapse, the developed countries will also be hurt.

As things stand, the G20 meeting will produce some concrete results: the resources of the IMF are likely to be doubled, mainly by using the mechanism of the "new arrangements to borrow", which can be activated without resolving the vexed question of reapportioning voting rights.

This will be sufficient to enable the IMF to help specific countries at risk but it will not provide a systemic solution for the less developed countries. Such a solution is readily available in the form of special drawing rights. SDRs are complex but they boil down to the international creation of money. Countries that can create their own money do not need them but periphery countries do. The rich countries should therefore lend their allocations to the nations in need.

Recipient countries would pay the IMF interest at a very low rate, equivalent to the composite average treasury bill rate of all convertible currencies. They would have free use of their own allocations but would be supervised in how the borrowed allocations were used to ensure they were well spent.

In addition to the one-time increase in the IMF's resources, there ought to be a big annual issue of SDRs, of say $250bn, as long as the recession lasts. It is too late to use the April 2 G20 meeting to agree this, but if it were raised by President Barack Obama and endorsed by others, this would be sufficient to give heart to the markets and turn the meeting into a resounding success.

The writer is chairman of Soros Fund Management and author of the forthcoming The Crash of 2008 (PublicAffairs 2009)


WALL STREET JOURNAL
One Way to Stop Bear Raids
Credit default swaps need much stricter regulation.

By George Soros
Tuesday, March 24th, 2009

In all the uproar over AIG, the most important lesson has been ignored. AIG failed because it sold large amounts of credit default swaps (CDS) without properly offsetting or covering their positions. What we must take away from this is that CDS are toxic instruments whose use ought to be strictly regulated: Only those who own the underlying bonds ought to be allowed to buy them. Instituting this rule would tame a destructive force and cut the price of the swaps. It would also save the U.S. Treasury a lot of money by reducing the loss on AIG's outstanding positions without abrogating any contracts.

CDS came into existence as a way of providing insurance on bonds against default. Since they are tradable instruments, they became bear-market warrants for speculating on deteriorating conditions in a company or country. What makes them toxic is that such speculation can be self-validating.

Up until the crash of 2008, the prevailing view -- called the efficient market hypothesis -- was that the prices of financial instruments accurately reflect all the available information (i.e. the underlying reality). But this is not true. Financial markets don't deal with the current reality, but with the future -- a matter of anticipation, not knowledge. Thus, we must understand financial markets through a new paradigm which recognizes that they always provide a biased view of the future, and that the distortion of prices in financial markets may affect the underlying reality that those prices are supposed to reflect. (I call this feedback mechanism "reflexivity.")

With the help of this new paradigm, the poisonous nature of CDS can be demonstrated in a three-step argument. The first step is to acknowledge that being long and selling short in the stock market has an asymmetric risk/reward profile. Losing on a long position reduces one's risk exposure, while losing on a short position increases it. As a result, one can be more patient being long and wrong than being short and wrong. This asymmetry discourages short-selling.

The second step is to recognize that the CDS market offers a convenient way of shorting bonds, but the risk/reward asymmetry works in the opposite way. Going short on bonds by buying a CDS contract carries limited risk but almost unlimited profit potential. By contrast, selling CDS offers limited profits but practically unlimited risks. This asymmetry encourages speculating on the short side, which in turn exerts a downward pressure on the underlying bonds. The negative effect is reinforced by the fact that CDS are tradable and therefore tend to be priced as warrants, which can be sold at anytime, not as options, which would require an actual default to be cashed in. People buy them not because they expect an eventual default, but because they expect the CDS to appreciate in response to adverse developments.
AIG thought it was selling insurance on bonds, and as such, they considered CDS outrageously overpriced. In fact, it was selling bear-market warrants and it severely underestimated the risk.

The third step is to recognize reflexivity, which means that the mispricing of financial instruments can affect the fundamentals that market prices are supposed to reflect. Nowhere is this phenomenon more pronounced than in the case of financial institutions, whose ability to do business is so dependent on trust. A decline in their share and bond prices can increase their financing costs. That means that bear raids on financial institutions can be self-validating.

Taking these three considerations together, it's clear that AIG, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and others were destroyed by bear raids in which the shorting of stocks and buying CDS mutually amplified and reinforced each other. The unlimited shorting of stocks was made possible by the abolition of the uptick rule, which would have hindered bear raids by allowing short selling only when prices were rising. The unlimited shorting of bonds was facilitated by the CDS market. The two made a lethal combination. And AIG failed to understand this.

Many argue now that CDS ought to be traded on regulated exchanges. I believe that they are toxic and should only be allowed to be used by those who own the bonds, not by others who want to speculate against countries or companies. Under this rule -- which would require international agreement and federal legislation -- the buying pressure on CDS would greatly diminish, and all outstanding CDS would drop in price. As a collateral benefit, the U.S. Treasury would save a great deal of money on its exposure to AIG.
Mr. Soros is chairman of Soros Fund Management and author of "The Crash of 2008" (PublicAffairs, 2009).
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123785310594719693.html

Wednesday, October 22, 2008

索罗斯:注资如何避免打水漂?

应委托银行管理部门对银行作出评估,还应暂时降低资本率要求,并救房市

  美国财政部长汉克·保尔森终于认识到,给银行注入资本是实施不良资产救援计划(TARP)的最佳方案。
   保尔森原来的计划是收购与房贷相关的不良证券,但这样做的问题在于信息不对称。对证券进行估价是很难的,而卖方比买方更清楚这些证券的价值,所以,在任 何一桩拍卖中,财政部都占不到便宜。只有财政部出一个更高的价钱来购买这些证券,这项计划才算是起到了救援的作用。但是,如果这项计划拯救的是那些资不抵 债的银行,纳税人又能得到什么回报呢?
  当时我就提出,更有效的救援方案应该是给那些背负不良证券的机构直接注入资本金,而不是像保尔森计划中那样把不良证券买过来。
   用政府的注资购买股权,会比改变公司的资产负债表问题少得多。7000亿美元优先股的认股权证,或许可以弥补这个房地产泡沫破裂之后形成的大缺口。不 过,在一个价值11万亿美元的市场中,需求方资金再添加7000亿美元,可能也还是止不住房价下跌的脚步。我们必须在供给面也采取措施。为防止房价过快下 跌,必须尽量减少丧失赎回权的抵押房产的数量。按揭的条款必须根据房主的支付能力作出调整。
  现在,英美都确定,以注资金融机构作为救援方案的重心。我认为,一个成功有效的注资过程应该是这样的:
   首先,应委托银行管理部门对银行作出评估,看银行需要多少额外资本才能满足8%的法定要求。银行管理部门对银行相当熟悉,也正在积极地检查和收集信息。 只要明确告诉他们估值应基于什么假设,他们能够很快给出一个估计值。一些较小、较简单的机构大可以依靠这些估计值,不过,诸如花旗银行和高盛这样的大型机 构可能要多费些脑筋。
  然后,有偿付能力的银行管理层将有这样的选择:要么自己来募集额外的资本金,要么投奔保尔森救助计划。后者将申明其愿意 购买新发行的可转换优先股的条款(可转换优先股比权证要好,因为这些银行以后应该不会需要额外资本注入了)。优先股股息率应该低一些,比如说5%,才不会 损害银行的盈利能力。新发的优先股会稀释现有股东权益,但现有股东将会得到与保尔森计划条款相同的优惠认购权,这样的话,如果他们愿意且能够拿出更多的资 本金,他们的权益就不会被稀释。这种优惠认购权应该可转让,因为如果这些条款设置得当,其他投资者是会接手的。
  通过这种手段,7000亿美元应该足以给整个银行系统注资,购买按揭相关证券并持有至到期的融资要求也能得到满足。而那些资不抵债的银行将不会被纳入注资计划,因此,联邦存款保险公司(FDIC)肯定会要求其他的资金来源来补缺。
   在实施注资方案的同时,政府还应降低最低资本要求,以便银行开展新业务。对于有资格加入注资计划的银行,美联储也应为其银行间借贷担保。这会使银行间市 场再次活跃起来,使Libor高出联储基金利率的利差回到正常水平,并使与Libor挂钩的企业和按揭贷款反常的高利率得以降低。
  如果房价显 著下跌,银行注资计划的成功几率也会降低。需要另外一套措施来把丧失赎回权房产保持在最低程度,并从根本上重塑美国病入膏肓的按揭金融体系。不过,即使有 这两手准备,衰退也难以避免——金融系统受损已经过于严重,特别是过去几天中发生的事更是造成了重创。但这些措施将缩减衰退的时间,降低严重程度。一旦经 济恢复正常,银行的最低资本要求须再度提高。
  国际金融体系也需要修补,但是,有理由对此乐观。欧洲已经意识到,它需要通过一个银行间信贷的政府安全网来对欧元作出补充。国际货币基金组织正试图启动一个新计划,来保护外围的国家免受风暴中心的影响。
  我所勾勒的这个注资计划,可以避免保尔森原计划中那种对难以定价的证券进行反向拍卖将遇到的种种困难。它将帮助经济重新启动,并可能为纳税人产生与我的索罗斯基金相媲美的回报。
  但是,时间非常关键。政府一度对情况失去了控制,因为他们一直落后于事情的发展。到他们采取行动的时候,那些本来可以稳定市场的措施都已经没有用了。只有快速宣布一套全面的措施,并有力地执行,情况才可能得到控制。
  正所谓“喊破嗓子不如甩开膀子”。■

作者为索罗斯基金会主席